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SUMMARY
Many Albertans are feeling short-changed given how much they contribute 
to the rest of Canada compared to how little help they get back when their 
economy is in serious trouble, as it has been lately. As a result, commentators 
and politicians in the province tend to focus their grievances on the unfairness 
of the federal equalization program. While it is true that the equalization 
program needs reform, that program was never meant to help a province such 
as Alberta, where GDP per capita and household incomes are above the national 
average, even in times when its economy shrinks. What Albertans should really 
complain about is the fiscal stabilization program, which is meant to be a form 
of insurance for provinces whose economies experience economic shocks. In 
reality, it is an insurance policy that has been designed so that it barely pays 
anything to Alberta.
That much was starkly evident in 2015–16, when the province’s revenues 
contracted by a staggering $8.8 billion and this so-called insurance policy paid 
out Alberta a grand total of $248 million. Alberta suffered an revenue reduction 
of $2,114 per capita, but the fiscal stabilization program caps payouts at a meagre 
$60 per head. Worse, the current formula does not count drops in resource 
revenue as meaningfully as it counts drops in other forms of revenue, which 
distinctly disadvantages Alberta and other resource-dependent provinces, 
especially Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador.
The fiscal stabilization program should be reformed to ensure that it actually 
provides adequate levels of insurance to the resource-dependent provinces. 
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1That is, after all, the stated purpose of the program. A new formula should be developed 
that will provide meaningful assistance to provinces when they need it. 
A fair formula for a fiscal stabilization program should meet the same criteria as any 
good insurance policy. It should cover only significant losses, which in this case should 
be a meaningful reduction in all of a province’s own-source revenues — including non-
renewable resource revenues — compared to an average of the previous five years. It 
should include a deductible to ensure that the insured party, the province in this case, still 
has an incentive to manage their fiscal affairs responsibly. And it should offer simple and 
transparent terms along with a streamlined claims process. The current formula violates 
these principles. Improving the formula will not save Alberta and other resource-rich 
provinces from all the pain of the occasional resource bust, but it will help alleviate some 
of it. That is what the fiscal stabilization program was meant to do. It is time to reform it 
so that it can finally live up to that promise for every province in the country.
21. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 2014 global oil-price downturn, slumping royalty and tax revenues, 
and rising provincial debts, provincial politicians and media commentators in Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador have called for changes to the federal 
equalization program because it has not benefited their provinces. As I argued in a  
Jan. 17, 2019 Calgary Herald article, while there are problems with the equalization 
program, these criticisms are misplaced. The equalization program was never intended to 
assist a province such as Alberta whose household incomes and GDP per capita remain 
above average. Instead, complaints about the lack of federal support for Alberta and 
the other resource-rich provinces should be directed at the federal fiscal stabilization 
program. Reforming the fiscal stabilization program should be a priority in revising the 
fiscal relations between the federal and provincial governments.
The objective of the fiscal stabilization program is to provide fiscal insurance to provinces 
that suffer extraordinary declines in revenues. In 2015–16, Alberta’s total own-source 
revenues declined by $8.8 billion, or $2,114 per capita. However, Alberta only received 
$248.3 million under the fiscal stabilization program because payments are limited to $60 
per capita.1 Clearly, the fiscal stabilization program only provided a minimal amount of 
fiscal insurance in the face of the steep downturn in the Alberta economy. 
The fiscal stabilization program needs to be reformed so that it fulfills its mandate of 
supporting provinces in the event of extraordinary declines in their revenues. In this 
briefing paper, we will discuss the rationale for an effective federal fiscal stabilization 
program and the principles that should be adopted in redesigning an effective fiscal-
insurance program. We then propose some alternative formulas, consistent with these 
principles, for calculating the fiscal-insurance payments and show the support levels 
that they would have provided to the provinces since the mid-1980s, had they been used 
instead of the actual formula. 
2.  THE RATIONALE FOR A FEDERAL FISCAL  
STABILIZATION PROGRAM
The rationale for a federal fiscal stabilization program is risk sharing.2 Provincial 
governments obtain most of their revenues from taxes, royalties and user fees derived 
from their specialized provincial economies. They are more exposed to economic shocks 
than the federal government, whose tax base encompasses all regional economies. If 
provincial economies face different positive and negative shocks, the federal government 
can pool the fiscal risks that individual provincial governments face.
1 
The federal Department of Finance website shows an advance payment to Alberta of $251.4 million, but 
officials at Alberta Treasury Board and Finance have indicated that the actual payment based on updated 
population data was $248.3 million: https://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp#Alberta. The website also 
indicates that there was an advance payment to Newfoundland and Labrador of $31.7 million for 2015–16.
2 
See Bucovetsky (1998), Lockwood (1999) and Boadway and Tremblay (2006) for models of 
intergovernmental grants based on the risk aversion of taxpayers in regional economies that face stochastic 
fluctuations in output.
3To illustrate the differences in economic risk, Figure 1 shows the year-over-year change 
in real per capita GDP in Alberta and the rest of Canada (ROC) from 1982 to 2017. It is 
no surprise that per capita output in Alberta has been more volatile than in the rest of 
Canada. In particular, per capita output in Alberta declined in 14 of the 36 years shown in 
Figure 1. Year-over-year declines of more than five per cent occurred in 1982, 2009, 2015, 
and 2016. There were nine years in which Alberta’s real per capita GDP declined while 
real per capita GDP increased in the rest of Canada. There were simultaneous declines 
in real per capita GDP in Alberta and the rest of Canada in only five of the 36 years. In 
one year, 1990, real per capita GDP increased in Alberta while it declined in the rest of 
Canada. These data indicate that there are opportunities for risk sharing between Alberta 
and the rest of Canada because the negative economic shocks to the Alberta economy 
are not highly correlated with negative shocks to the rest of the Canadian economy. And 
when they occurred in the same year, the negative shocks in the rest of Canada were 
generally smaller in percentage terms than in Alberta.3
FIGURE 1  YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGES IN REAL PER CAPITA GDP IN ALBERTA  
AND THE REST OF CANADA
By their nature, rich regions contribute more in federal tax revenues and generally 
receive less in federal public expenditure than do poorer regions, leading to ongoing net 
fiscal transfers to the poorer regions. While there may be other economic motivations 
for belonging to a federation, such as sharing the cost of public goods (for example, 
defence) or benefiting from greater access to markets through free trade, a fiscal-
insurance program can be one of the motivations for a rich but risky region to belong to a 
3 
The one exception was in 1991 when real per capita GDP declined by 3.8 per cent in the rest of Canada, while 
it only declined by 1.3 per cent in Alberta.
4federation. See Bucovetsky (1998). The net fiscal transfer that a rich region contributes in 
“normal” times could be considered its “fiscal-insurance premium.” In the case of Alberta, 
the net fiscal transfers have been estimated by Mansell and Khanal (forthcoming) at 
over $5,000 per person per year since 2000. It is no wonder that many Albertans are 
concerned that the “insurance coverage” from the federal government has been so 
low while their fiscal contributions to the federation have been so high. In the following 
sections, we discuss how the federal fiscal stabilization program could be reformed so 
that it provides Alberta and the other provinces with a greater degree of fiscal-insurance 
coverage in the event of economic downturns.
To indicate the size of the fiscal risk that the provincial governments face, Table 1  
shows the years in which there were percentage declines in their own-source revenues 
from their previous five-year averages since 1986–87. Three provinces — Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador — have suffered the largest and most 
frequent declines in own-source revenues. Seven times have Alberta and Newfoundland 
and Labrador recorded revenue reductions compared to the average over the previous 
five years. In Saskatchewan, this occurred four times. Some of the other provinces have 
also recorded significant revenue reductions, such as British Columbia in 2009–10 and 
New Brunswick in 1998–99. Nova Scotia and Quebec have only experienced minor own-
source revenue reductions. Prince Edward Island, Ontario and Manitoba have never 
experienced reductions in revenue compared to the previous five-year average.
TABLE 1  PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS’ OWN-
SOURCE REVENUES FROM PREVIOUS FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES
Alberta Saskatchewan Newfoundland and Labrador
British 
Columbia New Brunswick Nova Scotia Quebec
1986-87 34.4 12.7
1987-88 3
1988-89 5.8
1996-97 0.3
1997-98 11.4 0.4
1998-99 8.6 16.4
1999-00 1.2
2000-01 7.1
2001-02 1.7
2002-03 2.6
2009-10 4.1 6.8 0.007
2010-11 9.7
2014-15 10.8
2015-16 19.1 4.7 33.2
2016-17 24.5 9.4 5.6
2017-18 1.1 3.1 7.5
Source: Calculation by the author based on the Canadian Provincial Government Budget Data set  
available on The School of Public Policy’s website at https://www.policyschool.ca/publication-category/
research-data/.
5Not only have Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador experienced 
more frequent revenue reductions, they are relatively large, averaging 12.7 per cent, 6.3 
per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively. The revenue declines compared to a previous 
five-year average were also persistent. In the case of Alberta, the declines persisted over 
the periods 1986–89, 2009–11 and 2015–17. For Newfoundland and Labrador, there was a 
decline over the 1997–2001 period and more recently for 2014–18. Saskatchewan suffered 
declines in the three consecutive fiscal years 2015–18.
3.  THREE PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF A FISCAL-
INSURANCE PROGRAM
A fiscal-insurance program should be based on the same principles as an efficient 
insurance contract in the private sector. That is, an efficient insurance contract should 
(a) only cover events where significant losses are incurred by the insured, (b) preserve 
incentives for the insured to avoid losses, and (c) be simple and transparent with a 
streamlined claims-settlement process. Below we discuss how each of these key features 
should be applied to the design of a federal fiscal-insurance program.
3.1 COVERAGE OF SIGNIFICANT LOSSES
What should be covered? Provincial governments face fiscal uncertainty from 
unanticipated increases in expenditures and unanticipated declines in revenues. As with 
private insurance, there is no need to cover small, predictable fiscal losses. Only large, 
unanticipated losses should be covered.
Unanticipated increases in provincial expenditures, which are often due to natural 
disasters such as fires, floods, or droughts, are generally small compared to overall 
provincial expenditures, and spending to repair damages can be spread over several 
years. Also, governments have more control over expenditures than they do over 
revenues, leading to a potential moral-hazard problem if fiscal-insurance coverage is 
applied to all provincial spending increases. (See below.) These considerations imply that 
provincial governments’ expenditure increases should not be covered by fiscal insurance, 
but large declines in own-source revenues should be covered.
Which revenue losses should be covered? It can be argued that since resource revenues 
are the most volatile source of provincial revenues, they are a good candidate for fiscal-
insurance coverage. However, provincial governments can and should adopt fiscal 
policies to offset short- to medium-term resource-revenue fluctuations by establishing 
revenue-stabilization funds.4 They should also save some portion of resource revenues 
in sovereign wealth funds to deal with long-term declines in resource revenues. Still, 
in resource-based provincial economies, declines in resource revenues coincide with 
significant reductions in those governments’ other sources of revenues, such as provincial 
personal and corporate income taxes and sales and excise taxes. The overall decline in 
4 
As discussed below, the deductible for the fiscal-stabilization payments should be sufficiently high, and only 
a fraction of the revenue reduction above the deductible should be covered, in order to provide the provinces 
with the incentive to establish a revenue-stabilization fund.
6revenues can exceed the ability of a stabilization fund to finance budget deficits during 
a major downturn in the economy. From a provincial-budget perspective, it does not 
matter which source of tax revenue has declined. It is the total decline in revenues that 
will require either expenditure restraints or increased borrowing to cover budget deficits. 
These considerations suggest that a federal fiscal-insurance program should cover 
declines in a provincial government’s total own-source revenues. Coverage should not 
depend on which source of tax revenue has been responsible for the decline in revenues, 
but only significant reductions in total own-source revenues should be covered.
How should the decline in provincial own-source revenues be measured? The current 
fiscal stabilization program only covers year-over-year declines in provincial revenues. 
(See Section 4 for a description of the current program.) This is an overly restrictive way 
of defining an eligible revenue reduction, because if a province has been receiving a 
stable revenue stream over a number of years and then faces an abrupt and persistent 
decline in its revenues, the required fiscal adjustment may stretch over several years. For 
these reasons, eligible revenue losses should be calculated as the decline in revenues in a 
given year compared to the province’s average annual own-source revenue in the recent 
past; say, for instance, the previous five years. Using a moving average of past revenues 
provides a better indication of the size and duration of a revenue downturn than a simple 
year-over-year comparison. Furthermore, a year-over-year calculation of entitlement could 
lead to a perverse result. For example, if a provincial government received a large, abrupt 
increase in revenue in one year, followed by a decline the following year to a normal level, 
it might be eligible for a fiscal-insurance payout under the current program based on year-
over-year changes in revenues. For these reasons, the eligible revenue losses should be 
based on declines in own-source revenues compared to a past moving average.
3.2 PRESERVING LOSS AVOIDANCE INCENTIVES
Insurance coverage can erode the insured’s incentives to avoid or limit losses. In private 
insurance markets this is known as the moral-hazard problem. To maintain appropriate 
levels of loss-prevention activity, private insurance contracts limit the coverage of 
losses by imposing deductibles and/or only covering a percentage of the eligible claims 
(co-insurance). The same principle should apply to fiscal insurance. As noted above, 
provincial governments can cope with moderate revenue declines by establishing 
revenue-stabilization funds and more generally by balancing their budgets over a 
normal business cycle, running surpluses during booms to offset borrowing to finance 
deficits during economic downturns. Maintaining a manageable debt level and a good 
credit rating allows the province to borrow to finance “normal” fluctuations in revenues. 
To preserve provincial incentives to maintain prudent fiscal policies, fiscal-insurance 
coverage should follow the private sector practice of only covering losses that exceed 
some percentage of “normal” own-source revenues (a deductible) and then only covering 
a fraction of eligible losses (co-insurance). In Section 5, we propose three alternative 
fiscal-insurance formulas to illustrate how different deductibles and coverage rates would 
have affected payments to the provinces in the past.
Should fiscal-insurance coverage take into account discretionary tax-policy changes? 
Tax-rate cuts, changes to tax bases or reductions in tax-collection efforts could reduce 
7provincial revenues but increase fiscal-stabilization payments. Should a fiscal stabilization 
program have rules to prevent “fiscal arson”? The current fiscal stabilization program 
allows the federal finance minister to adjust the payments to reflect “changes made by 
the province in the rates or structure of provincial taxes or of other means of raising the 
revenue of the province from the rates or structures in effect in the preceding fiscal year.” 
(Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-8) Part II.) However, if 
there is a reasonably large deductible in place, such measures are probably not needed 
to prevent a provincial government from (continuing with the “fiscal arson” metaphor) 
burning down its home to collect insurance. Furthermore, prudent fiscal policy in some 
circumstances may require lower tax rates to stimulate the economy during a downturn. 
It is also very difficult to accurately calculate the reduction in revenues that would result 
from a provincial tax cut, because tax bases will generally increase over time in response 
to the tax-rate cut. The decline in revenues will be less than the “mechanical” calculation 
of the revenue loss based on the revenue generated per tax point.5 Indeed, in some 
cases, as the study by Dahlby and Ferede (2018) has shown, provincial corporate tax-rate 
cuts may lead to higher revenues in the long run. In addition, if a provincial government 
cuts its tax rate on a tax base that is shared with the federal government, it will normally 
boost federal revenues because a lower provincial tax rate will lower tax avoidance 
and evasion activity, thereby increasing the shared base. These so-called vertical tax 
externalities are substantial in the Canadian context and provide a rationale for federal 
support for, rather than punishment of, provincial tax cuts. For these reasons and others 
that are discussed below, there should not be any adjustment to fiscal-stabilization 
payments based on provincial tax measures that may reduce revenue collections.
3.3  SIMPLE, TRANSPARENT CONTRACTS AND STREAMLINED  
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT
Simple, transparent insurance contracts and streamlined claims-adjustment processes 
lower transactions costs, reduce the likelihood of expensive legal disputes and promote 
confidence in the reliability of the insurer. Similarly, the regulations determining payments 
under a fiscal-insurance program should be simple and transparent, and payments should 
be made in a timely manner. A simple formula with well-defined parameters, such as 
the deductible and the coverage rates, would allow provincial politicians, government 
officials and the general public to feel confident that payments will be made under the 
specified conditions. Streamlining the calculation of the payments is another reason why 
adjustments for changes in provincial tax policies, referred to above, should be avoided, 
because calculating the effects of such policies on tax revenues is complicated and 
would lead to controversy and delays.
5 
See, for example, the estimates of the revenue per tax point in the Government of Alberta, 2018–21 Fiscal 
Plan, p. 133.
84.  FISCAL-STABILIZATION PAYMENTS UNDER  
CURRENT FORMULAS
As noted in the introduction, Alberta received only $248.3 million for 2015–16 under the 
fiscal stabilization program because payments are capped at $60 per capita. Lifting 
the cap on the payments would be a welcome measure, but the existing formulas for 
calculating the payments should also be revised, because they do not provide adequate 
fiscal insurance when there are declines in resource revenues. For example, the current 
formula does not take into account a reduction in resource revenues if the year-over-year 
decline in resource revenue is less than 50 per cent, and even then it only provides a 
payment if non-resource revenues decline by more than five per cent.
In this section, we compute the federal fiscal-stabilization payments that would have 
been made to Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador with the existing 
formulas using the same revenue data that will be used to calculate the payments 
under the three alternative programs in Section 5. Our objective is not to replicate the 
payments that would have been made by the federal government in the absence of the 
cap, because we do not know what data on provincial revenues the federal government 
would use in these calculations, but to compare the current formulas with the alternative 
formulas in Section 5 using the same provincial revenue data.6
The formulas that determine payments under the current fiscal stabilization program, in 
the absence of a cap, depend on the year-over-year change in resource revenues. Three 
cases are distinguished under Part II of the Federal Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act 
that deals with the fiscal-stabilization payments (FSP) to the provinces. Case 1 applies 
if natural resource revenues (NRR) in year t, NRRt, are higher than in the previous year. 
In this case, the fiscal-stabilization payment for year t, FSPt, is the difference between 
the year-over-year reduction in total revenues and five per cent of total revenues in the 
previous year. In other words, in Case 1, the FSP covers total revenue reductions in excess 
of five per cent of the previous year’s total revenues. Case 2 applies when natural resource 
revenues decline by more than 50 per cent. The FSP is equal to the difference between 
the reduction in non-resource revenues, Rt-1 – Rt, and five per cent of the previous year’s 
non-resource revenues, plus the difference between the decline in natural resource 
revenues and 50 per cent of natural resource revenues in the previous year. Effectively, 
the FSP covers reductions in non-resource revenues and resource revenues in excess of 
five per cent and 50 per cent of the previous years’ revenues from these sources. Case 
3 applies when natural resource revenues decline but by less than 50 per cent of the 
previous year’s revenues. In this case, the FSP is the difference between the decline in 
non-resource revenues and five per cent of the previous year’s non-resource revenues, 
and the FSP does not compensate the province for the decline in resource revenues.
The box below shows the formulas that apply in these three cases. Clearly, the current 
system violates the principle of a simple formula to determine coverage. No coverage 
is provided for resource-revenue reductions when resource revenues decline by less 
than 50 per cent. Furthermore, in all cases there is a 100-per-cent coverage rate for 
6 
The revenue sources used by the federal government in calculating fiscal stabilization can be found in Section 
4(1) of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Regulations, 2007. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/
SOR-2007-303.pdf.
9non-resource-revenue reductions beyond the five-per-cent deductible. One can argue 
that this coverage rate is too generous for non-resource-revenue reductions. Finally, as 
pointed out earlier, restricting payment to year-over-year reductions in revenues means 
that significant reductions in revenues sustained over several years are not covered.
Current Formulas Used to Calculate Fiscal-Stabilization Payments:
Case 1: 
FSPt = 0.95∙(Rt–1 + NRRt–1) – (Rt + NRRt)  NRRt > NRRt–1
Case 2 
FSPt = (0.95∙Rt–1 – Rt) + (0.5∙NRRt–1 – NRRt) NRRt < 0.5∙NRRt–1
Case 3 
FSPt = 0.95∙Rt–1 – Rt     0.5∙NRRt–1 < NRRt ≤ NRRt–1
There are obvious design flaws in the current formulas, but perhaps the most important 
flaw is the lack of coverage for the provinces that are dependent on resource revenues. 
Table 2 shows payments that would have been made with these formulas using the same 
provincial revenue data that will be used to calculate fiscal-stabilization payments for 
the alternative formulas proposed in Section 5. Under the existing formulas, but without 
the cap, Alberta would only have been eligible for payments in 1986–87, 2008–09 and 
2015–16. Payments in the latter year would have been substantial, $3.9 billion, with total 
payments over the entire period of $6.4 billion. The current formulas would have been 
even less generous to Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador. Saskatchewan 
would only have received $458 million, and Newfoundland and Labrador would have 
received $258 million.
TABLE 2  FISCAL-STABILIZATION PAYMENTS WITHOUT THE CAP 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Alberta Saskatchewan Newfoundland and Labrador
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
1986-87 783.3
1991-92 96.0
1996-97 10.5
1997-98 192.1
2000-01 3.0
2001-02 362.4
2008-09 1,739.0
2015-16 3,900.4
2017-18 52.1
Source: Calculations by the author.
Notes: These are the payments that would have been made based on the same revenue data used to 
simulate payments under the alternative formulas in Table 3.
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5. REFORMING THE FISCAL STABILIZATION PROGRAM 
Reforming the fiscal stabilization program should start with lifting the $60 per capita cap. 
However, as the previous section indicated, the current formulas used to calculate fiscal-
stabilization payments should also be revised because they do not provide adequate 
fiscal insurance when there are declines in resource revenues. In this section, we describe 
below three alternative formulas for calculating payments that are consistent with the 
principles of efficient insurance coverage described in the previous section.
5.1 THREE ALTERNATIVE FISCAL STABILIZATION PROGRAMS
Table 3 shows how three alternative fiscal stabilization programs, consistent with the 
principles outlined in the previous section, would have provided support for Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador in the past.7 The three programs differ 
in terms of the size of the deductible and the coverage rates. Program A has a five-per-
cent deductible and a 50-per-cent coverage rate for losses beyond the five-per-cent 
deductible. In other words, only reductions in annual own-source revenues in excess of 
five per cent of the average own-source revenue over the previous five years would be 
eligible for a payment and only 50 per cent of that would be covered. Program B also 
has a five-per-cent deductible, but a 75-per-cent coverage rate. Program C has a lower 
deductible, at three per cent, and lower coverage rate, at 66 per cent, than Program B. 
The general formula for the fiscal-stabilization payment in year t, FSPt is:
FSPt = α ∙ [∑
5
i=1
OSRt−1
5
− (1 +  β) ∙ OSRt] 
where OSRt is the province’s own-source revenue in year t. For Program A, α = 0.50 and β 
= 0.05. For Program B, α = 0.75 and β = 0.05. For Program C, α = 0.66 and β = 0.03.
Table 3 shows that Alberta would have received payments in five years, totaling $6.8 
billion under Program A and $10.2 billion under Program B, and in seven years totaling 
$10.6 billion under Program C. Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador would 
have received much smaller amounts, ranging from $264 million to $602 million for 
Saskatchewan and $972 million to $1.6 billion for Newfoundland and Labrador. (These 
payments are in current dollars. Adjusting for inflation, the payments in the 1980s and 
’90s would be much higher in 2019 dollars.) Payments under Program A would have 
covered less than 50 per cent of the revenue reductions of these provinces over this 
period. Programs B and C would have covered between 45 and 50 per cent of the 
revenue losses for Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador. For Saskatchewan, only 
Program C would have covered about one-third of its revenue loss, because under 
programs A or B, with the five-per-cent deductible, the revenue reductions in 2015–16 
and 2017–18 would not have been eligible for fiscal-stabilization payments.
7 
Not shown in Table 3 are payments of $134.3 million, $201.5 million, and $208.5 million for New Brunswick for 
1998–99 and $217.8 million, $326.7 million, and $601.9 million for British Columbia for 2009–10 for programs 
A, B, and C respectively.
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While the three alternative programs would have provided financial relief to Alberta, 
they would only have eased the financial burden and not eliminated it. Figure 2 shows 
Alberta’s fiscal deficits in the years in which it would have received payments under these 
formulas. In spite of these hypothetical payments, the province would still have incurred 
financial deficits.
TABLE 3  FISCAL-STABILIZATION-PROGRAM PAYMENTS UNDER THREE  
ALTERNATIVE FORMULAS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Alberta Saskatchewan Newfoundland
Program A Program B Program C Program A Program B Program C Program A Program B Program C
1986-87 1,164.8 1,747.2 1,642.2 71.7 107.5 119.3
1987-88 1.1
1988-89 40.3 60.4 182.1
1997-98 52.5 78.7 90.8
1998-99 30.1 45.2 61.7
2000-01 17.6 26.4 45.5
2009-10 231.5
2010-11 700.7 1,051.0 1,321.0
2014-15 155.8 233.7 277.1
2015-16 2,091.9 3,137.8 3,153.5 105.3 636.0 953.9 899.0
2016-17 2,771.6 4,157.3 4,032.8 192.3 288.4 369.8 17.4 26.1 94.4
2017-18 7.2 62.5 93.7 149.7
Total 
Payments 6,769.2 10,153.8 10,564.1 264.0 396.0 601.6 971.8 1,457.7 1,618.2
Percentage 
of Revenue 
Reduction
32.6% 48.9% 50.8% 14.1% 21.2% 32.2% 30.0% 45.0% 50.0%
Source: Calculations by the author.
Notes: Program A has a five-per-cent deductible and a 50-per-cent coverage rate. 
Program B also has a five-per-cent deductible, but a 75-per-cent coverage rate. 
Program C has a three-per-cent deductible and a 66-per-cent coverage rate.
12
FIGURE 2  ACTUAL ALBERTA GOVERNMENT DEFICITS VERSUS DEFICITS UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE FISCAL STABILIZATION PROGRAMS
Source: Provincial government budget data and author’s calculations.
Comparing the fiscal-stabilization payments under the three alternative formulas with 
the current formulas, we see that, for Alberta, Program A would have provided about 
the same payment as the current formulas and programs B and C would have provided 
about $4 billion more than the current formulas. For Saskatchewan, only Program C, with 
the three-per-cent deductible, would have provide a larger payment than the current 
formulas. For Newfoundland, all three alternative programs would have provided much 
higher payments than under the current formulas.
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5.2 IMPACT ON FEDERAL FINANCES OF THE ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS
Table 4 shows the total payments under each of the programs for the fiscal years 
in which the provinces (including British Columbia and New Brunswick) would have 
received payments. Program A, which provides the least coverage, would have cost 
the federal government $8.4 billion over the entire period. Perhaps more relevant for 
current controversies, the federal government would have paid about $5.8 billion in the 
three fiscal years 2015–18 to Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Under programs B and C, total federal payments over the entire period would have been 
between $12.5 billion and $13.6 billion. Over the 2015-18 period, Program B would have 
cost the federal government $8.7 billion, and Program C would have cost $8.8 billion.
TABLE 4  TOTAL PAYMENTS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Program A Program B Program C
1986-87 1,236.5 1,854.7 1,761.5
1987-88 0.0 0.0 1.1
1988-89 40.3 60.4 182.1
1997-98 52.5 78.7 90.8
1998-99 164.4 246.6 270.2
2000-01 17.6 26.4 45.5
2009-10 217.8 326.7 833.4
2010-11 700.7 1,051.0 1,321.0
2014-15 155.8 233.7 277.1
2015-16 2,727.8 4,091.7 4,157.8
2016-17 2,981.2 4,471.8 4,497.0
2017-18 62.5 93.7 156.9
Total Payments 8,357.1 12,535.6 13,594.3
Source: Calculations by the author.
Notes: See Table 3.
14
Figure 3 shows payments under the three alternative fiscal stabilization programs as a 
percentage of federal revenues. Measured in this way, the largest burden would have 
been in 1986–87 at just over two per cent of federal revenues for Program B. Payments 
would have been less than one per cent of federal revenues in following years, but then 
would have jumped to close to 1.5 per cent in 2015–16 and in 2016–17 for Program C.
FIGURE 3  FEDERAL STABILIZATION PAYMENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL REVENUES
Source: Fiscal Reference Tables https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/frt-trf/index-eng.asp; and author’s calculations.
Another way of measuring the impact of these alternative fiscal stabilization programs 
is how they would have impacted the federal budget balances. Figure 4 shows the 
federal surpluses and deficits, the red bars, and how payments under Program C would 
have contributed to the federal deficits in those years (the blue bars). In the years in 
which the federal government was running surpluses, 1997–98, 1998–99 and 2000–01, 
the payments would have been relatively low and would not have converted federal 
surpluses into deficits. In the eight years in which the federal government had deficits, 
the payments under Program C would have contributed to those deficits but would 
have been relatively minor components of the total deficit. It should also be noted that 
the federal deficits in 2009–10 and 2010–11 were due to the downturn in the Canadian 
economy and the fiscal-stimulus policy adopted to combat it. The more recent federal 
deficits have been incurred when the Canadian economy is doing well and are not 
consistent with a policy of balancing the budgets over the business cycle. Overall, federal 
payments, under even the most generous fiscal stabilization program modelled here, are 
well within the federal government’s fiscal capacity. Payments under a fiscal stabilization 
program will reduce a provincial government’s deficit and increase the federal 
government’s deficit. Since the federal government can borrow at a lower interest rate 
than the provinces can, this is consistent with the fundamental motivation for insurance in 
shifting the burden of a loss to those who have a greater ability to absorb it. 
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FIGURE 4  THE IMPACT OF FISCAL-STABILIZATION PAYMENTS ON FEDERAL SUR-
PLUSES AND DEFICITS UNDER PROGRAM C
Source: Fiscal Reference Tables https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/frt-trf/index-eng.asp; and author’s calculations.
6. CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction, provincial politicians and media commentators in Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador have called for changes to the federal 
equalization program because it has not benefited their provinces in the face of steep 
reductions in their revenues. The equalization program should be reformed because it 
biases the recipient provinces’ fiscal policies in favour of higher taxes and lower spending 
on productivity-enhancing public infrastructure projects. See Ferede (2017) and Cyrenne 
and Pandey (2015). However, Alberta and the other resource-rich provinces should also 
pressure the federal government to reform the fiscal stabilization program in order to 
address their concerns about the lack of federal support in the wake of the downturn 
in the oil and gas sector. Reforming the fiscal stabilization program should go beyond 
the removal of the $60 per capita cap on payments. Simple formulas for calculating the 
payments should be used and:
• Payments should be based on declines in a province’s own-source revenues from 
an average of its past years’ own-source revenues.
• The program should preserve incentives for provinces to maintain prudent fiscal 
policies by only covering losses that exceed some percentage of “normal” own-
source revenues (a deductible) and then only covering a fraction of eligible 
losses (co-insurance). 
• Formulas determining payments should be simple and transparent with no 
adjustment for changes in provincial tax policies that may affect own-source 
revenues.
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Reforming the fiscal stabilization program along these lines would go a long way to 
addressing the concerns of the provinces about the lack of federal support in the face  
of significant downturns in their revenues.
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